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Executive Summary 
1. Recent and planned policy changes in the NHS, including the abolition of the Medical Practices 
Committee, revised tendering arrangements for new practices, readily available information on 
practices via NHS Choices, and letting patients register with any practice, will increase potential 
competition amongst general practices.  Since practices cannot compete on price they may compete 
on the quality they offer to patients.  A necessary condition for greater competition to improve 
quality is that patient choice of practice is affected by practice quality.   
 
2. Surveys of patients about their reasons for choosing a practice may reveal which factors influence 
behaviour but do not provide quantitative estimates of the relative importance of these factors.  The 
two previous studies of actual choices made by NHS patients show that distance has a major effect 
on practice choice but that it is not the only determinant as most patients do not choose their 
nearest practice.  The studies suggest that patients are more likely to choose practices with female 
GPs, more clinics and longer opening hours.  Neither of the studies had direct measures of practice 
quality. 
 
3. /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ǁĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ŽŶ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ amongst 
practices, allowing for other factors such as distance to the practice, the gender and age of practice 
GPs, their country of qualification, and the type of practice contract and whether the practice is 
permitted to dispense as well as prescribe. 
 
4. We use April 2009 data on the choice amongst 994 practices by 3.4M patients in 2875 (Lower 
Super Output Areas) in the East Midlands Strategic Health Authority.  We use a rich set of alternative 
measures of quality. They include summary measures derived from the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) which records practice performance on a large set of quality indicators, the rate of 
emergency admissions for Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSCs), and average patient 
satisfaction with practices.   
 
5. We find that patients are more likely to choose practices which are nearer to their home, which 
have a higher proportion of GPs qualified in Europe, a higher proportion of female GPs, and a lower 
average GP age.  Patients appear to prefer practices with PMS rather than GMS contracts though 
this effect is weaker than other characteristics.  Dispensing status has no effect on patient choice.  
 
6. Given other practice characteristics, patients are more likely to choose practices which earned 
more quality points under the QOF pay for performance scheme.  This measure of quality predicts 
practice choice better than the other measures of quality, such as patient satisfaction or ACSC 
admissions.  
 
7. The positive effect of quality on choice of practice is robust to the method of estimation, and to 
allowing for practice catchment areas.  It holds across patient age and gender groups, and across 
areas with different patient socioeconomic characteristics.  We also allow for potential biases caused 
by the effect of patient mix on practice quality and for errors in measuring quality and find that the 
estimated effect of quality is increased.  
 
8. The relevant effect for assessing the incentives for practices to increase quality is the increase in 
the number of patients who wish to join a practice when its quality increases. This depends on the 
effect of quality on the probability that a patient will choose a practice and on the number of 
patients who would consider choosing the practice.  There are on average 25,000 potential patients 
aged 25 and over within 2km of the practices in our data set.  Thus even small increases in the 
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probability that an individual patient will choose a practice when its quality increases could lead to 
economically significant increases in the number of patients wishing to join the practice.  
 
9. We estimate that a practice which increases its QOF score by 10 points (the average score in our 
data was 956) will increase the number of patients aged 25 and over who wish to join its list by 163 
[95% CI: 134, 192].  A 10% increase in QOF points will increase demand for the practice by 14.4% 
[95% CI: 13.2%, 15.5%].  
 
10. Because we have examined the effect of quality measures on the stock of patients on the list of 
practices at one moment in time (April 2009) we have not been able to estimate how rapidly 
practice lists would respond to changes in quality.  Our results suggest strongly that patients care 
about quality when choosing their practice and that an increase in the quality of a practice will in the 
long run lead to non trivial increases in its list. This is a necessary condition for changes in the 
structure of services and competition to affect quality.  In future work we will address the question 
of whether greater competition leads to higher quality by using longitudinal data to examine the 
relationship between changes in competition and changes in quality. 
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1. Introduction  
Governments facing fiscal pressure have increasingly turned to proposals to create or enhance 
consumer choice for public services e.g. Besley and Ghatak (2003), Hoxby (2003), Le Grand (2003).  
In  health care, choice is a popular reform model adopted by administrations of  different political 
orientations in many countries, including the US, the  UK, Denmark, Italy (Lombardy), the 
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. The belief is that by increasing choice for patients, providers of 
care will become more responsive to patient demand which, in turn, will drive greater efficiency in 
delivery and funding.  But such reforms have been controversial and whether enhanced patient 
choice will make care providers more responsive to quality is not well established. Consumers may 
lack information about medical care providers, and measures of quality may be noisy and difficult for 
them to interpret.  
 
More generally, a necessary condition for greater competition to improve quality is that a provider 
will face higher demand if they improve their quality. Thus one approach to the issue of whether 
competition promotes quality is to test the crucial assumption that quality affects demand. This is 
what we do in this paper.  We examine whether health care consumers in England respond to 
differences in quality when they make their choice of family doctor. England ŝƐ ĂŶ ĞǆĐĞůůĞŶƚ  “test 
bed ?. First, all individuals in the UK are entitled to choose a family doctor practice and need to do so, 
as family doctors both provide almost all primary care and are also the gatekeepers for any specialist 
or hospital care the individual may need.  Second, care is tax funded and free at point of use, so price 
plays no role in choice. Third, an important major strand in government policy in England has been 
the promotion of competition both amongst hospitals and family doctors and to make this policy 
work the government has actively promoted the provision of information on the performance of 
medical providers to the public. Fourth, the UK has been a world leader in the development of 
quality indicators for primary care which are both publicly available and are salient to family doctors 
as their performance on these indicators is used in pay-for- performance contracts that accounts for 
over 20% of their average total remuneration.  
 
ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĂƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĚŽĐƚŽƌĐŽƵůĚďĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚǁĞllbeing, 
there are few studies of the effects of quality on patient choice of family doctors.  One reason for 
this is that good measures of physician quality are rarely publicly available.  We exploit the 
availability of such data in England. We use data on the choices made by 3.4 million patients from 
amongst nearly 1000 family doctor practices to estimate the determinants of choice and, in 
particular, to test whether quality affects choice. Our data contain information on the distances from 
patients to potential practices and a rich set of measures of practice quality, some of which are 
published and observable by patients, as well as characteristics of the practice which have been 
shown to influence choice of patients, including age and gender of the family doctors in the practice, 
their country of qualification, and the type of contract the practice has with the NHS.
1
   
 
We find that patients are more likely to choose practices which are of higher quality as measured by 
the publicly available data on practice performance.  The positive effect of clinical quality on choice 
is robust across patient age and gender groups, to patient socioeconomic characteristics, to allowing 
for unobserved heterogeneity in patient preferences, and to the potential endogeneity of the clinical 
quality measure. In addition, patient choice is more responsive to published than unpublished 
measures of quality. We also find, as expected given that most primary healthcare requires patients 
                                                 
1
 Our measures of practice quality are discussed in detail in Section 3.3, but include summary measures derived from the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) which records and rewards practice performance on a large set of clinical and 
administrative quality indicators, the rate of emergency admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions, and average 
patient satisfaction with the practice.   
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to attend their practice, that patients ? valuation of practices decreases with distance from their 
home. Patients are also likely to choose practices which have a higher proportion of GPs qualified in 
Europe, a higher proportion of female GPs, and a lower average GP age.  
 
This responsiveness of choice to practice quality is economically meaningful as well as statistically 
significant. Using our most conservative estimates of the effect of quality on choice, the average 
marginal effect of an increase of one standard deviation in measured quality is to increase the 
probability of a practice being chosen by a patient by 0.0083.  In terms of the metric of distance, the 
average patient would be willing travel an additional 125 metres to join a practice with one standard 
deviation higher clinical quality. These results might appear to suggest a small influence of quality on 
the choices of individual patients.  However, the relevant effect for assessing the potential incentive 
for practices to improve quality is the increase in the number of patients who wish to join a practice 
when its quality increases. This depends on the effect of quality on the probability that a patient will 
choose a practice and on the number of patients who would consider choosing the practice.  In our 
data set there are on average over 25,000 potential patients within 2km of a practice.  We estimate 
that an increase of one standard deviation in clinical quality will increase the number of patients 
over the age of 24 choosing a practice by just over 1000, an increase of around 15 percent.  
 
Our results contribute to the literature on choice and competition in health care.  The theoretical 
literature is generally supportive of the proposition that greater competition improves quality if 
prices are regulated (Gaynor, 2006).
2
  Most empirical studies find that when providers face fixed 
prices greater competition is associated with higher quality (see Gaynor and Town (2012) and 
Gravelle et al (2012) for reviews. For England, Cooper et al, (2011) and Gaynor et al, (forthcoming) 
provide evidence for a positive impact of the pro-competitive policy that operated post-2006 for 
hospitals.  Studies of patient choice of hospital in the US (Burns and Wholey, 1992; Cutler et al, 2004; 
Ho, 2006; Howard, 2005; Luft et al, 1990; Pope, 2009; Tay, 2003), the Netherlands (Varkevisser et al, 
2012), Italy (Moscone et al, 2012), and in England (Beckert et al, 2012; Gaynor et al, 2012; Sivey, 
2011) find that higher hospital quality increases demand.  But there are very few studies of the 
determinants of quality on patient choice of family doctors.   This is primarily because measures of 
quality are rarely publicly available. Research to date has tended to focus on other attributes of care 
or proxies for quality.  For example, studies have shown the importance of distance (for the UK, 
Salisbury, 1989; Billinghurst and Whitfield, 1993; Dixon et al, 1997; McLean and Sutton, 2005; for 
Norway, Godager, 2009), other aspects of accessibility such as opening hours) (e.g. Dixon et al, 1997) 
and attributes of the doctor such as age, gender and ethnicity (e.g. Godager 2009).
3
  In the absence 
of any measures of clinical quality such attributes may be used by consumers as signals of a better 
match and so higher quality. Stated preference studies have shown that, hypothetically, patients are 
willing to trade-off measures of consultation quality, thoroughness of physical examinations and the 
GP's knowledge of the patient against the accessibility of the consultation and waiting times for 
appointments (Cheraghi-Sohi, 2008; Scott and Vick, 1999; Vick and Scott, 1998). Revealed 
preference evidence on the relationship between choice of practice and proxies for quality is more 
mixed (e.g McLean and Sutton, 2005), though recent studies following the introduction of a list 
system in Norway have found evidence of small positive responses to factors such as practice 
mortality rates and the volume of services provided (Iversen and Luras 2011, Biorn and Godager 
2010).  Finally, Pike (2010) examines the cross sectional association between competition between 
                                                 
2
 There are caveats about the role of imperfect information and the required assumptions about provider cost functions 
and patient prefrences (Brekke, et al, 2010; Gravelle, 1999; Gravelle and Masiero, 2000; Karlsson, 2007; Gravelle et 2012; 
Halonen and Propper, 2012).   
3
 ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐŽĨƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶ'WƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ'WƐĂƌĞƉĂŝĚďǇĨĞĞĨŽƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĂŶĚ'WƐ ?ƉƌŝĐĞƐĨŽƌĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĚ ?ĨŝŶĚ
that GPs in areas with less competition (whether measured by distance to other GPs or by GPs per capita) charge higher 
prices (Gravelle et al, 2013; McRae, 2009; Richardson et al, 2006; Savage and Jones, 2004). 
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general practices and quality and finds that practices with more rivals within 500m have higher 
quality (as measured by patient satisfaction and a measure of clinical care).  
 
More broadly, our paper contributes to the literature on whether choice based reforms will provide 
incentives for firms to increase quality. There has been a great deal of interest in recent years in 
competition in education, both theoretically and empirically (e.g., Epple and Romano 1998; Hoxby 
2000; Epple, Figlio, and Romano 2004). In this literature, as in health, the predictions from 
theoretical models are often ambiguous and the empirical evidence quite contested (Hoxby 2000; 
Rothstein 2007; Bayer and McMillan 2005; Burgess, Propper and Wilson 2005). Our results thus add 
to the evidence on the conditions under which gains from consumer choice in the provision of public 
services may be realised.   
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2. Institutional setting 
To receive primary medical care in the British National Health Service (NHS) patients must register 
with a general (family) practice, which also acts as a gatekeeper for elective hospital care.  The NHS 
is financed almost entirely from general taxation and patients face no charges for NHS health care, 
apart from a small charge for dispensed medicines.   
 
General practitioners (GPs) are not employees of the NHS, apart from a small proportion directly 
employed by local primary care organisations (Primary Care Trusts - PCTs).  GPs are organised in 
general practices, most of which are limited liability partnerships owned by the GPs.  The NHS 
contracts with the general practices, not with the individual GPs.  English practices have on average 
4.2 general practitioners (GPs) and around 6,600 patients (Information Centre, 2011). 
 
Practice contracts with the NHS to supply services to patients are of two types. Just over half of 
general practices have the General Medical Services (GMS) contract whose terms are set by national 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞE,^ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚDĞĚŝĐĂůƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶ ? ? GMS 
practices are paid a mixture of lump sums, capitation, quality incentive payments, and items of 
service.  Around 80% of practice revenue varies with the number of patients on the practice 
revenue.  Most of practice revenue (over 60%) is generated by capitation payments which are 
determined by a national formula which takes account of the demographic mix of practice patients 
and local morbidity measures. Quality incentives from the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) 
(Roland, 2004) generate over 20% of practice revenue.  For a given quality level, QOF revenue 
increases with the number of patients. Practice payments for vaccinating and screening specified 
target proportions of the relevant practice population also increase with the total list.  Practices are 
reimbursed for the costs of their premises but have to fund all other expenses, such as hiring 
practice nurses and clerical staff, from their revenue. 
 
Around 48% of practices are paid under a Primary Medical Services (PMS) contract. These contracts 
are negotiated between the practice and their local PCT. Under the PMS contract, the practice 
receives a lump sum in exchange for agreeing to provide similar services to those required under the 
GMS contract, plus additional services for particular patient groups. The amount received is typically 
the amount the practice would have received under GMS, plus an addition intended to cover the 
cost of the extra services. PMS practices also receive QOF payments, though they are paid less than 
GMS practices for the same quality achievement because some of the QOF payments relate to 
activities which are also paid for directly under PMS contracts. As under GMS, the practice has to 
meet its expenses from its revenue.   
 
One of the strands in policy in the English National Health Service (NHS) in recent years has been the 
promotion of competition amongst hospitals in the secondary care sector and amongst general 
practices in primary medical care. In general practice the national body which controlled entry of 
new practices was abolished in 2002 and the Department of Health (DH) introduced a tendering 
process to make it easier for new practices to be established, especially in under-doctored areas 
(Department of Health, 2006).  Patients are to be given the right to register with any practice in 
England (Department of Health, 2010).  A website, NHS Choices, has been set up by the DH 
containing information on the characteristics of practices, such as the clinics they offer, their 
performance under the national quality incentive (QOF) scheme, and results from patient 
satisfaction surveys.
4
 
                                                 
4
 http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Yourchoices/GPchoice/Pages/ChoosingaGP.aspx. It is also possible to find detailed 
information on performance of practices in an area under the national P4P scheme via http://www.qof.ic.nhs.uk/search/ 
and information on patient satisfaction survey in http://www.gp-patient.co.uk/info/ 
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The method of payment for practices ensures that, whether they have GMS or PMS contracts, their 
revenue will increase with the number of patients.  The question we address is whether practices 
can attract more patients by improving their quality.  
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3. Data 
We construct a rich data set on patients and practices by linking a number of NHS administrative 
data sets (Attribution Data Set, General Medical Statistics, Quality and Outcomes Framework, 
Hospital Episode Statistics) with small area census and socio-economic data from Neighbourhood 
Statistics.  Sources are in Table A1. 
 
3.1 Patients  
The Attribution Data Set (ADS) contains, for each administratively defined homogenous small 
geographical area in England (known as a Lower Super Output Area, LSOA), the number of patients 
by age/sex band who are registered with each general practice at 1 April 2010. There are 32,482 
LSOAs in England, with a minimum population of 1000 and a mean population of 1500.
5
   
 
To reduce computational burden we limit our analysis to the choice of practice by patients resident 
in one of 10 geographically defined Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) in England. We selected the 
East Midlands SHA which contains 2875 LSOAs.  It has a mixture of densely populated urban areas 
and rural areas, has an ethnically diverse population allowing investigation of the effects of ethnicity 
and other socio-ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽŶƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƚĂƐƚĞƐĨŽƌpractice characteristics, and it is far 
from the English-Welsh and English-Scottish borders so that we do not have to drop any LSOAs 
whose patients are registered in Welsh or Scottish practices whose characteristics we do not 
observe.
6
  
 
We exclude practice registrations of children because their choices are made by their parents and 
we cannot distinguish in our data between patients with and without children.  We also exclude 
patients aged 18-24 because students in post-secondary education may continue to be registered at 
ƚŚĞŝƌƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉractice despite living away from home. We therefore analyse the choice of 
practice by the 3.372M individuals in the East Midlands SHA who are aged 25 and over.   
 
The ADS data contain age (in bands) and gender of each patient.  We attribute socio-economic 
characteristics to patients by their LSOA of residence.  The characteristics we include are the 
proportion of the LSOA who are income deprived (defined as receiving income related social security 
benefits), the proportion of adults with no formal educational qualifications, the proportion who 
report themselves as being in fair or good, rather than poor, self rated health, and the proportion 
who are of Asian ethnicity.   We also categorise an LSOA as urban or rural.  These patient and small 
area level variables allow us to examine whether different types of patient have different 
preferences over practice characteristics.   
 
3.2 Practice characteristics 
We use data from the General Medical Services census (taken on 30 September 2010 and 2009) to 
measure the average age of GPs, the proportion of female GPs, the proportion of GPs qualified in 
the UK, in Europe, in Asia, and elsewhere.  We also have data on the type of practice contract (PMS 
or GMS), whether the practice has opted out of providing out of hours care for its patients, and 
whether the practice is permitted to dispense medicines as well as prescribe them.  Data on the type 
of contract are missing for 13 practices and rather than reduce the number of practices we assumed 
                                                 
5
 On average over England the population registered with general practices is about 7% greater than estimates of the 
population derived from the decennial population census (Ashworth et al, 2005).  The difference is due to lags in the 
updating of patient registration data when patients die or change practice.  Since general practices are paid according to 
their registered lists it is appropriate to model the determinants of the number of patients registered with practices as we 
wish to examine whether practices are paid more, via larger lists, when their quality is greater.  
6
 The ADS includes patients resident in England but registered in practices located in Wales and Scotland as well as 
England.  
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they had GMS contracts and included a dummy variable indicating that the contract status dummy 
had been imputed.   
 
3.3 Practice quality  
We have several measures of the quality of the practice. We use these to examine which aspects of 
quality are most salient to patients and to test the robustness of our results. Our primary measure of 
quality is practice performance on the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). The QOF is a 
national pay-for-performance scheme introduced in April 2004 and whose broad structure has been 
maintained subsequently.  From 2006/7 practices could receive up to 1000 points for achieving 
quality indicators grouped into four domains (clinical, organisation, patient experience, and 
additional services) and for a holistic care indicator.  Each point earned the practice £125.
7
  As noted 
above, QOF payments account for around 20% of general practice gross income.
8
 
 
As a measure of clinical quality QOF points have two potential drawbacks.  Up to 665 of the 1000 
QOF points are awarded for having disease registers and for the percentage of eligible patients in a 
disease area for whom various indicators are achieved.
9
 No points were awarded for achievement 
less than 40% and points increased linearly with percentage achievement above 40% up to an upper 
threshold ranging from 60% to 90%, with no points earned for further increases in achievement. In 
addition, research has suggested that some practices ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞĚ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ĂƐ  “ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?to 
increase their reported achievement (Gravelle et al, 2010). Thus points are an imperfect measure of 
actual achievement on a clinical indicator.  However, performance measured by the QOF total points 
is readily available to the public (via the government NHS Choices website designed to help patients 
choose health care providers). Although it may be an imperfect measure of quality because of upper 
and lower thresholds and exception reporting, we use total QOF points as our main quality measure 
as it is most visible to patients.   
 
Specifically, we use total QOF points for 2006/7. We choose a 4 year lagged measure (choice of 
practice is observed for 2010) to reduce reverse causality from patient choices to quality.  However, 
in robustness tests we also use total points for 2009/10, the average total points from 2006/7 to 
2009/10, and 2006/7 points earned on each of the domains of the QOF.  We also use the raw QOF 
data on clinical indicators to construct measures of overall reported achievement and population 
achievement which are not affected by upper and lower thresholds and exception reporting.
10
   
 
We also consider other, non-QOF, measures of quality. The first is a measure of the quality of 
practice disease management: the ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƐƚŽƚĂůĂŶŶƵĂůĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƌĂƚĞĨŽƌŵďƵůĂƚŽƌǇ
Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSCs).
11
  ACSCs are conditions for which good quality management in 
general practice should prevent emergency admissions for complications (AHRQ, 2004; Purdy et al., 
                                                 
7
 In more detail, the domains, points and indicators in 2006/7 were as follows. Clinical (80 indicators covering 19 
conditions, carrying 655 points in total), organisation (43 indicators carrying 181 points for record keeping, medicines 
management, education and training), patient experience (4 indicators carrying 108 points for length of consultations and 
having undertaken patient surveys),  and additional services (8 indicators carrying 36 points for services including cervical 
screening, child health surveillance, maternity, and contraception).  In addition there was holistic care indicator which 
awarded up to 20 points on the basis of performance in the 3
rd
 worst condition in the clinical domain. 
8
 dŚĞYK&ĚĂƚĂŝƐĞǆƚƌĂĐƚĞĚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĨƌŽŵƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚƌĞĐŽƌĚƐĨŽƌƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞh< 
9
 For example, indicator DM7 is the proportion (N/D) of eligible diabetic patients whose HbA1c was 10 or less and carried 
11 points, where N is the number of patients for whom the indicator is achieved and D is the number who are declared 
eligible for the indicator.   
10
 Overall reported achievement is weighted average of the reported achievement (N/D) on the clinical indicators, where 
the weights are the maximum points available for the indicator.  Practices can exception report patients for clinical 
indicators on various grounds, including the patient refusing to attend for treatment or having contra indications.  We 
therefore also calculate overall population achievement as the maximum points weighted average over clinical indicators 
of N/(D + E) where E is the number of exceptions.  Further details are in Table B1. 
11
 ACSCs listed in Table A2. 
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2009).  ACSCs admission rates are used as measures of access to good quality primary care inside 
and outside the UK.  
 
The second type of non-QOF measures are three patient satisfaction measures from the GP Patient 
Survey for 2009 which was sent to a 5.7M random sample of patients in all practices in England. We 
use the answers to three questions.  The first question concerns general satŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ  ? “In general, 
ŚŽǁ ƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ĂƌĞ ǇŽƵ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƌĞ ǇŽƵ ŐĞƚ Ăƚ ǇŽƵƌ 'W ƐƵƌŐĞƌǇ Žƌ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ? ? ?.  The second 
question is about ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŽƉĞŶŝŶŐŚŽƵƌƐ ? “How satisfied are you with the hours that your 
'WƐƵƌŐĞƌǇŽƌŚĞĂůƚŚĐĞŶƚƌĞŝƐŽƉĞŶ ? ?).  Patients answer both questions on a 5 points scale and we 
use the proportion of the practice ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ǁŚŽ ƐĂǇ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ  “sĞƌǇ ƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ? Žƌ  “&ĂŝƌůǇ
ƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ? ?  dŚĞ ƚŚŝƌĚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ĂƐŬƐ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ  “tŽƵůĚ ǇŽƵ ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚ ǇŽƵƌ 'W ƐƵƌŐĞƌǇ Žƌ ŚĞĂůƚŚ
centre tŽ ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ǁŚŽ ŚĂƐ ũƵƐƚ ŵŽǀĞĚ ƚŽ ǇŽƵƌ ůŽĐĂů ĂƌĞĂ ? ? ĂŶĚ ǁĞ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ǁŚŽ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ  “zĞƐ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇ ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚ ? Žƌ  “zĞƐ ? ŵŝŐŚƚ ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚ ? ? ĂƐ
ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ  “EŽƚ ƐƵƌĞ ? ?  “EŽ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ ŶŽƚ ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚ ? ?  “EŽ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇ ŶŽƚ
recomŵĞŶĚ ?Žƌ “ŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ? ?
 
3.4 Distance measurement and choice sets 
Figure 1 shows the practices and LSOAs in the East Midlands. Some practices have more than one 
surgery. In total there are 994 practices with 1232 surgeries in the choice sets of East Midlands 
patients. We obtained the practice branch grid references from their postcodes and calculated the 
straight line distance between the centroid of each LSOA and all GP surgeries within 50km of LSOAs 
in the East Midlands SHA.  We assume that a patient considers the distance to the nearest surgery of 
a practice when choosing amongst practices. So we use the distance to the nearest surgery of a 
practice from the LSOA centroid as our measure of practice distance. 
 
Since over 99% of the patients were registered with a practice with a surgery within 10km of their 
LSOA centroid, we restrict the choice set for an LSOA to practices within 10km.  In some urban areas 
there were more than 100 practices within 10km. To reduce the computation burden in these cases 
we further restricted the choice set to the 30 practices with the largest number of patients from the 
LSOA.  When practices had the same number of patients from the LSOA we broke the ties by 
distance, taking the practices which were nearest to the LSOA centroid.  
 
Practices are supervised by administrative bodies known as Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). Although 
patients are not required to register with practices located in the PCT in which they live, they may be 
less likely to choose practices in a different PCT because PCTs provide information about practices 
located within the PCT.  Moreover, PCT boundaries are in part determined by physical features such 
as railway lines and rivers which may make it more difficult to access a practice than is suggested by 
the straight line distance. To allow for this, we take account of whether practices are in the same 
PCT as the LSOA of the patient.  
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Figure 1.   East Midlands SHA: practice locations and LSOAs 
 
3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the practice characteristics, distances and the small area (LSOA) characteristics. 
Over a third (36%) of GPs in practices are female and over a quarter (27%) were trained outside 
Europe.
12
  The mean distance to the nearest practice is 1.2km and the mean distance to practices 
within the LSOA choice set is 4.8 km. There are 22 practices on average within the choice set of each 
LSOA.  Figure 2, panel (a) shows that the distribution of distance to nearest practice has more mass 
on the left hand side, but there are rural LSOAs with long distances to nearest practice in our data 
set. The mean distance to the chosen practice is 1.9 km. The distribution is shown in Figure 2, panel 
(b). This is skewed to the left as 40% of East Midlands SHA patients are registered with the nearest 
GP practice. This is higher than the proportion (32%) reported in Dixon et al (1997) for patients in 
practices in three other areas of England.  Around 27% of practices in LSOA choice sets are located in 
a different PCT and 19% of patients choose a practice in a different PCT.   
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 We do not have data on ethnicity or first language of GPs but the majority of doctors trained outside Europe will not 
have English as a first language. 
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Table 1.   Descriptive statistics  
 mean sd min max N 
GP practice characteristics      
Average GP age 2009 47.9 6.7 31.5 72.5 994 
Proportion female GPs 2009 0.362 0.248 0 1 994 
Proportion GPs trained outside Europe 2009 0.267 0.354 0 1 994 
Opted out of out of hours care 2009 0.613 0.487   994 
PMS contract 2009 0.479 0.500   994 
Dispensing practice 2009 0.204 0.403   994 
Patients
1
 aged 25 and over registered with practice 4886 3063 653 24988 994 
Total patients
1
 registered with practice 7020 4412 1087 34946 994 
Quality measures      
QOF 2006/7 clinical points 632.8 36.4 330.5 655 987 
QOF 2006/7 organisational points 166.5 21.0 13.2 181 987 
QOF 2006/7 patient experience points 103.3 16.1 0 108 987 
QOF 2006/7 additional services points 35.3 2.8 6 36 987 
QOF 2006/7 holistic care points 18.3 3.1 0 20 987 
QOF 2006/7 total points 956.1 63.6 426.5 1000 987 
Population achievement 2009/10 0.721 0.041 0.379 0.829 985 
Reported achievement 2009/10 0.782 0.041 0.484 0.887 985 
QOF 2009/10 total points 940.5 46.9 545.5 1000 994 
Average QOF total points 2006/7-2009/10 954.6 44.8 545.5 1000 994 
ACSCs 2006/7 per 10,000 259 76 28 679 989 
Overall patient satisfaction 2009 0.89 0.06 0.57 0.99 994 
Satisfaction with opening hours 2009 0.80 0.06 0.45 0.97 994 
Prop patients would recommend practice 2009 0.82 0.10 0.38 0.99 994 
Average distances from LSOA to practices      
Distance to practices in LSOA choice set (km) 4.833 1.647 0.348 9.888 2875 
Distance to chosen practice (km) 1.892 1.336 0.125 9.867 2875 
Distance to nearest practice (km) 1.198 1.164 0.023 9.81 2875 
Practices in different PCT      
Proportion practices in choice set in different PCT 0.272 0.445 0 1 2875 
Proportion practices chosen in different PCT 0.191 0.393 0 1 2875 
Proportion of nearest practices in different PCT  0.049 0.216 0 1 2875 
LSOA characteristics      
Proportion female 0.507 0.022 0.276 0.618 2875 
Proportion pop in fair or good self-rated health 0.907 0.032 0.760 0.983 2875 
Proportion of adults without qualification 0.231 0.071 0.035 0.430 2875 
Proportion non white 0.065 0.130 0 0.948 2875 
Income deprivation score 0.143 0.110 0.013 0.830 2875 
Urban 0.731 0.444   2875 
Proportion of LSOA registered at nearest practice 0.399 0.263 0.001 0.998 2875 
Number of practices in LSOA choice set 22.3 10.2 1 30 2875 
1
 Whether resident in the East Midlands SHA or outside it. 
 
 
ŽĞƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂĨĨĞĐƚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?ǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh<  11 
 
 
 
 (a) Distance to practices in choice set 
 
 
(b) Distance to practice chosen 
 
Figure 2.   Distributions of distances to nearest practice and to practice chosen 
 
Table A3 reports the correlations amongst the quality measures.  It is clear that these measures are 
not identical. There are reasonably high correlations amongst the QOF points measures.
13
 ACSC 
emergency admissions are a negative measure of quality and are slightly negatively correlated with 
other quality indicators.  Although the QOF was intended to improve care for long term conditions 
and to reduce hospital admissions, there is only weak negative correlation between ACSCs and QOF 
points. This may be because there are both negative and positive correlations between admissions 
for particular ACSCs and the QOF clinical indicators for management of those conditions (Bottle et al, 
2008; Downing et al, 2007; Dusheiko et al, 2011; Purdy et al, 2011).   The three patient reported 
measures are reasonably highly correlated with each other but much less well correlated with the 
QOF measures.  Finally, the reported achievement 2009/10 and population achievement 2009/10 
measures, which use more of the information used to compute QOF clinical indicators, are highly 
though not perfectly correlated with total 2009/10 QOF points and with each other.  
                                                 
13
 In some cases this is due to the construction of the measures: clinical points contribute over 60% of total points, and the 
holistic care points are based on performance in the third worst clinical domain. 
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4. Estimation  
4.1 Model 
We use McFadden's (1974; 1978) random utility choice model and estimate conditional logit models 
ŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?There are nA LSOAs and their choice sets contain nJ different practices 
in total. All na patients in LSOA a choose a practice from the same set Ca: na  = 
a
ajj C n¦ , where naj is 
the number of LSOA a residents who choose practice j.  The number of patients choosing practice j is  
1
An
j ajan n  ¦ and there are 1Jn jjN n  ¦ = 1An aa n ¦ patients in total.   
 
The utility for individual i living in LSOA a if she chooses practice j is 
 
  iaj iaj iaju Hc x ȕ             (1) 
 
xiaj = ( 1 ,...,iaj Kiajx x ) is a vector of K observed variables and Hiaj is random error term observed by the 
patient i but not the econometrician.  Each patient i in LSOA a chooses the practice in their choice 
set Ca which yields the highest realised value of uiaj.  
 
Assuming that the Hiaj errors are independently and identically distributed according to the type 1 
extreme value distribution, the probability that patient i in LSOA a chooses practice j is    
 
 
1
exp( ) exp( )
a
iaj iaj iajj CP

cc
ª ºc c ¬ ¼¦x ȕ [ ȕ            (2) 
 
The log-likelihood for this conditional logit model is  
 
 ln L = 
1 1
exp( )
ln
exp( )
A
a
a
i
n n iaj
iaja j C i
iajj C
yc   
cc
ª ºc« »c« »¬ ¼
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x ȕ
x
              (3) 
where yiaj = 1 when practice j is chosen by individual i in LSOA a and is zero otherwise. 
 
/ĨǁĞĂƐƐƵŵĞ ?ĂƐŝŶŵŽƐƚŽĨŽƵƌŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŽǀĞƌƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĐŚĂƌĂĐteristics do 
not vary across different types of individual, only variables which vary by LSOA and practice (xaj) will 
affect choice probabilities and thus the probability of choice of practice j by an individual in LSOA a is 
the same for all individuals in LSOA a.  Hence 
 
 
1
exp( ) exp( )
a
iaj aj ajj CP

cc
ª ºc c ¬ ¼¦x ȕ [ ȕ          (4) 
 
and the log-likelihood is  
 ln L = 
1
exp( )
ln
exp( )
A
a
a
n aj
aja j C
ajj C
nc 
cc
ª ºc« »c« »¬ ¼
¦ ¦ ¦
x ȕ
x ȕ          (5) 
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so that the log of the choice probability for practice j in choice set Ca is weighted by the number of 
patients in LSOA a who choose practice j.
14
   
 
To reduce the computational burden from assuming that patients in an LSOA can choose from 
amongst any of the practices in or near the East Midlands SHA, we estimate the model after 
imposing the restriction that the choice set for patients in an LSOA is restricted to the practices 
within 10 km of the LSOA centroid.  McFadden (1978) has shown that maximum likelihood produces 
consistent estimates of the coefficients ɴ, which are the marginal patient utilities from practice 
characteristics, even with imposed choice sets which are subsets of the true choice set. (See 
Appendix C for a discussion.)  
 
We examined our baseline assumption of homogeneous individual preferences in three ways.  First, 
because we have data on the numbers of individuals in age and gender groups in each LSOA who 
choose each practice, we estimate versions of (5) for each age and gender group, so that naj is now 
the number of patients in an LSOA in a given age/gender band who choose practice j.  Second, 
although we do not observe any other individual characteristics, we do have information on the 
average socio-economic characteristics of LSOAs. To investigate whether preferences about 
practices vary with these characteristics we stratify LSOAs separately by the proportion of the 
population who are income deprived, non-white, have no educational qualifications or are in fair or 
good self reported health.   Finally, we allow the coefficients ɴ in individual utility functions to vary 
randomly across individuals according to a normal distribution and we estimate mixed logit models 
of their mean and standard deviation.  
 
4.2 Reported effects  
The estimated coefficients 
Öȕ  convey information about the sign of the effect of an attribute on 
patient utility and on the probability of choice since ÖÖ Ö Ö/ (1 )aj kaj k aj ajP x P PEw w   . The magnitudes of 
the marginal effects Ö /aj kajP xw w vary across practices and LSOAs.  To get a more readily interpretable 
quantitative estimate of patient preference across practice characteristics we generally report the 
average of the marginal effects Ö /aj kajP xw w : 
 
  1 Ö Ö Ö1
a
a k aj aja j Cn n P PE  ¦ ¦        (6) 
  
rather than the coefficients.   
 
The estimated marginal effects of practice characteristics are typically very small.  But the potential 
incentives for practices to increase quality to attract patients depend on the change in demand for 
the practice.  This depends on the change in the probability that patients will wish to join the 
practice (i.e. the marginal effects) and on the number of patients in whose choice set the practice 
falls.  On average there are 74,529 people aged 25 and over within 5 km of a practice and 25,070 
within 2 km. Thus even small changes in the probability of an individual choosing a practice can have 
a non-trivial effect on demand for the practice. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 All models estimated using Stata 12. A subset were re-estimated using NLogit.  
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We therefore also report the estimated average number of additional patients a practice would 
receive from a unit increase in practice characteristic xkj 
 
    
 
* ** *
ÖÖ1 1 j
J J
a aja Sj
J Jj S j S
kj kj
n Pn
n x n x

 
§ ·w§ ·w ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸w w© ¹ ¨ ¸© ¹
¦¦ ¦   
     **1 Ö Ö Ö1J j a k aj ajJ j S a S n P Pn E ª º « »¬ ¼¦ ¦                     (7) 
 
Sj = { }aa j C is the set of East Midlands LSOAs whose choice sets include practice j. SJ*  is the set of 
n
J* 
(= 482) practices which draw at least 99% of their list from East Midland LSOAs.   
 
The elasticity of demand for practice j with respect to xjk  is  
 
  Ö Ö Ö Ö1Ö Ö jj kj kjk a aj aja Skj j j
n x x
n P P
x n n
E 
w  w ¦            (8) 
 
and we report the weighted average elasticity of demand  
 
    * *Ö Ö 1 Ö Ö Ö1Ö Ö ÖJ J jj j kj k kj a aj ajj S j S a Skj jn n x x n P Pn x n n E  § ·w  ¨ ¸¨ ¸w© ¹¦ ¦ ¦         (9) 
 
We also calculate marginal rates of substitution between the k ?ƚŚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐxkj and the 
distance daj in kilometres between the LSOA centroid and the practice.  In our preferred model utility 
depends on a cubic function of distance so the marginal rate of substitution varies across practices 
and LSOAs:  
 
 
2
11 12 13
Ö/
Ö Ö Ö/ 2 3
kj iaj ajaj k
kd
aj iaj kj aj aju
x u d
MRS
d u x d d
E
E E E
w w w    w w w          (10) 
 
aj
kdMRS  is the additional distance that a patient in LSOA a would be willing to travel to practice j a 
practice if xkj increased by one unit. To avoid the computational burden in estimating standard errors 
for the average of (10) across all patients we evaluate the MRSkd at the mean distance to practice 
chosen and, using the results in Hole (2007), estimate standard errors using the delta method.  
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5. Results 
5.1 The effect of quality, distance and practice characteristics 
We begin by exploring the responsiveness of choice to our key variables of interest  W practice quality 
and distance. Table 2 presents our baseline model. Quality is measured by four year lagged total 
QOF points (2006/7) and we allow for non-linearity in distance with a cubic function of distance from 
the LSOA centroid to the nearest surgery of the practice. Other covariates are practice 
characteristics: whether the practice is in the same PCT as the LSOA, mean GP age, proportion of 
female GPs, the proportion of GPs qualified outside Europe (where GPs qualified in Europe is the 
baseline), the type of contract the practice has (GMS is the baseline category), and whether the 
practice has opted out of providing out of hours cover for its patients. 
 
Table 2.   Estimated marginal effects of quality, distance and practice characteristics 
 Average Marginal Effect z 
QOF 2006/7 Total points 0.00013 6.87 
Distance (cubic) -0.06778 -14.18 
Practice in different PCT -0.04751 -10.12 
GP age -0.00144 -13.31 
Prop female GPs 0.01508 6.12 
Prop GPs non Europe trained -0.03029 -10.36 
Opted Out 0.00543 2.49 
PMS contract 0.00564 2.95 
BIC 11714907 
 McFadden R
2 
0.3955 
 N LSOA 2,870 
N GP practices 987  
N patients 3,364,263  
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of variables on number of patients aged 25 and over registered with the 
practice.  Models also contained a dummy for missing PMS status. 
 
 The table reports the average marginal effects of variables on the probability that a practice is 
chosen.  The first row shows that patients are more likely to choose a practice with higher quality. 
An increase of 10 QOF points increases the probability of choice of practice by 0.0013. Note the 
small magnitude of this estimate is in part because of the scale of the QOF measure (the mean 
number of QOF points is 633 with a standard deviation of 64). The second row shows that patients 
dislike distance and prefer practices that are closer to their homes, and the third that, conditional on 
distance, patients prefer practices in the same PCT.
15
 
 
In terms of observed GP characteristics, patients prefer practices with younger GPs, with a higher 
proportion of female GPs, with a lower proportion of non-European qualified GPs, practices that 
have opted out of out-of-hours cover and those with PMS contracts. These results for practice 
gender and ethnicity mix, and average age, are robust across all model variants that we estimated 
and confirm earlier research findings on the choice of GPs in the UK. The literature suggests that 
female patients prefer consultations with female GPs so we expect that on average patients are 
more likely to choose practices with a higher proportion of female GPs.  GPs who have qualified 
outside Europe are less likely to have English as a first language, so practices with a higher 
proportion of such GPs will have less demand.  The positive effect of a practice opting out of 
                                                 
15
 As PCTs boundaries may reflect physical features that are hard to cross, the coefficient on PCT may be interpreted as a 
(non-linear) distance parameter.  
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providing services to patients outside normal working hours seems paradoxical at first sight.  
However, patients at a practice which has opted out will not necessarily experience worse access. 
When practices opt out the responsibility for providing out of hours care for their patients passes to 
the PCT.  This need not lead to a reduction in the availability of out of hours care for patients 
compared to practices which do not opt out because much of the out of hours care is subcontracted 
by practices to commercial and cooperative deputising services.  It may be that practices which opt 
out are then able to provide better care during normal hours.  The effect of the practice opting out is 
much less robust than the effects of other practice characteristics.  Patients may prefer practices 
with PMS contracts since such PMS contracts usually require the practice to provide additional 
services.
16
 
 
5.2 Alternative quality measures 
To further examine the effect of quality we estimate a series of modifications to our baseline model. 
In Table 3 we compare five different specifications of clinical quality.  Although all models also 
contain the full set of practice characteristics used in our Table 2 baseline model, we report only the 
average marginal effects for the quality measures and distance.  Results for the other characteristics 
were very similar to those in the baseline model.  Column (1) presents estimates using total 2006/7 
QOF points.  Column (2) examines the separate effects of the components of the 2006/7 QOF. This 
model performs slightly better than the other, simpler, models which use only one QOF points 
measure, but two of the components (holistic care and patient experience) have negative, though 
insignificant, effects. This is possibly because of collinearity amongst the five components.  Column 
(3) examines this further and uses only the 2006/7 clinical points. The results show that clinical 
points are positively associated with choice of practice but the model performs slightly worse than 
the model with total 2006/7 QOF points.   The effects of distance are very similar for these first three 
models using quality measures derived from the 2006/7 QOF. Columns (4) and (5) present results 
from models with total QOF 2009/10 points and the average of total QOF points over the period 
2006/7 to 2009/10 respectively. In both cases greater distance has a negative marginal effect and 
higher QOF total points has a positive marginal effect.  The marginal effect of total 2009/10 QOF 
points is much smaller and is less precise than the effect of total 2006/7 QOF points.  The 
instrumented results, reported later, suggest that this is due to endogeneity. 
 
In Table 4 we examine patient satisfaction with their practice and willingness to recommend it as 
measures of practice quality. We again do not report estimated average marginal effect for other 
practice characteristics as these are robust to the quality specification, but all models include these 
variables.  Column (1) shows that if overall patient satisfaction is the only measure of quality and no 
other covariates are included in the model, patient satisfaction is strongly correlated with choice of 
practice. However, the overall fit of the model is poor compared to those which include a full set of 
practice characteristics.  When we also include other practice characteristics and our baseline 
measure of clinical quality (total QOF 2006/7 points) in column (2) the marginal effect of overall 
patient satisfaction becomes negative and insignificant.  This suggests that patient satisfaction is 
summarising the effect of practice characteristics on patient utility, as suggested in Robertson et al 
(2008), but makes no independent contribution to predicting patient choice of practice once practice 
characteristics and practice quality are accounted for.
17
 
                                                 
16
 tĞĂůƐŽĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚŵŽĚĞůƐǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂĚƵŵŵǇǀĂƌŝĂďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĞĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƉƌĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ?
The average marginal effect of dispensing status was small and non significant. Practices are allowed to dispense medicines 
for patients who would find it otherwise difficult to use a pharmacy. Although this is more convenient for patients who 
register with a dispensing practice, other patients may prefer to register with practices which are more conveniently 
situated with respect to pharmacies, which may explain the insignificant effect of dispensing status on demand. 
17
 The lack of precision on the patient satisfaction measures may also reflect measurement error as these measures are 
based on an achieved sample of about 5% of patients, whilst the ACSC admission rate and QOF points are based on all 
relevant patients. 
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Table 3.  Comparison of models with alternative QOF based quality measures  
Quality measured by QOF 2006/7 total 
points 
(1) 
QOF 2006/7 total 
points 
(2) 
QOF 2006/7 clinical 
points 
(3) 
Av 2006/7-09/10 
total points 
(4) 
QOF 2009/10 total 
points 
(5) 
  AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z 
QOF 2006/7 total points 0.00013 6.87         
QOF 2006/7 clinical points   0.00015 2.71 0.00019 5.69     
QOF 2006/7 organisational points   0.00018 4.90       
QOF 2006/7 patient experience    -0.00003 -0.78       
QOF 2006/7 additional services    0.00139 4.12       
QOF 2006/7 holistic care points   -0.00020 -0.47       
Av QOF total points 2006/7-2009/10       0.00026 6.947   
QOF 2009/10 total points         0.000017 2.569 
Distance (cubic) -0.06778 -14.18 -0.07626 -9.83 -0.06695 -12.00 -0.09046 -17.89 -0.03005 -7.334 
BIC 11714907  11710963 
 
11724753 
 
11783137 
 
11806537  
McFadden R2 0.3955  0.3957 
 
0.3950 
 
0.3949 
 
0.3937  
N LSOA 2870  2870 
 
2870 
 
2870 
 
2870  
N GP practices 987  987 
 
987 
 
994 
 
994  
N patients 3364263  3364263 
 
3364263 
 
3372124 
 
3372124  
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects. Models also contain same covariates as model in Table 2.   
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Table 4.   Models with quality measured by patient satisfaction  
 Quality measure: overall satisfaction Quality measure: access satisfaction Quality measure: would recommend 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z 
QOF 2006/7 total points   0.00012 6.338   0.00012 6.322   0.00013 6.996 
Overall Satisfaction 0.24984 41.6
0 
-0.00725 -0.885         
Access Satisfaction     -0.18348 -5.50 -0.01072 -1.571     
Would recommend          0.27598 225.71 0.02226 3.121 
Distance (cubic)   -0.06504 -10.928   -0.06419 -11.372   -0.07284 -15.016 
BIC 19439563  11714835  19466172  11714636  19374984  11713209  
McFadden R2 0.0018  .3955  0.0004  .3955  0.0051  .3956  
N LSOA 2870  2870  2870  2870  2870  2870  
N GP practices 994  987  994  987  994  987  
N patients 3372124  3364263  3372124  3364263  3372124  3364263  
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects. Models (2), (4), (6) contain same practice covariates as model in Table 2. 
 
Table 5.   Alternative distance specifications 
 Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic Quintic Log distance 
 AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z 
QOF 2006/7 Total points 0.00019 7.89 0.00014 7.10 0.00013 6.87 0.00013 6.96 0.00013 6.94 0.00026 6.45 
Distance  -0.07747 -16.36 -0.06962 -14.60 -0.06778 -14.18 -0.06914 -14.34 -0.06894 -14.24 -0.21689 -13.44 
BIC 11886627 
 
11720567 
 
11714907 
 
11713827 
 
11713833 
 
12363341  
McFadden R
2 
0.3867 
 
0.3952 
 
0.3955 
 
0.3956 
 
0.3956 
 
0.3621  
N LSOA 2,870 2,870 2,870 2,870 2,870 2,870  
N GP practices 987  987  987  987  987  987  
N patients 3,364,263  3,364,263  3,364,263  3,364,263  3,364,263  3,364,263  
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects.  The average marginal effect of distance in the log distance model is the effect of a unit increase in log km. Models contain same practice 
covariates as model of Table 2.  
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Columns (3) and (4) use patient satisfaction with access as a quality measure. It is statistically 
significant when it is the only explanatory variable in the demand model, but it has the wrong sign, 
as it is negative.  This may reflect a negative correlation between practices with high demand and 
longer waits for consultations.  As with overall satisfaction, access satisfaction becomes insignificant 
when other practice characteristics and total QOF 2006/7 points are included in the model in column 
 ? ? ? ?ŽůƵŵŶ ? ? ?ƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐƵƌǀĞǇŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ “ǁŽƵůĚƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚ ?ĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇ
associated with choice and column (6) that this variable retains its significant positive marginal effect 
when practice characteristics and total QOF 2006/7 points are included.  The overall performance of 
this last model is very similar to the model where total QOF 2006/7 points is used as the quality 
measure (Table 3, column (1)).  
 
We investigated two further QOF based measures of clinical quality (reported achievement and 
population achievement which allow for lower and upper thresholds and exception reporting). 
Neither measure was significant and reported achievement had the wrong (negative) sign. Finally, 
emergency admissions for ambulatory sensitive conditions (ACSC 2006/7) were insignificant when 
added to baseline model with total QOF 2006/7 points. (See Appendix Table B1).  
 
This battery of test of alterative quality measures supports our baseline estimates in which we use 
2006/7 total QOF points as the single overall measure of practice quality to predict patient choice.  
In statistical terms 2006/7 total QOF points fits the data very nearly as well as the model including all 
separate QOF sub-components and predicts a little better than total QOF 2009/10 points and the 
average of total QOF points 2006/7 to 2009/10.  Importantly, it is also more plausible as a measure 
which affects patient choices.  It is publicly reported on the NHS Choices web site aimed at helping 
patient choice, unlike the more nuanced measures of the components of the total score, or 
adjustments using QOF data to deal with gaming, or measures based on ACSC emergency 
admissions.  Finally, a lagged measure is more likely to be exogenous to current choices (we further 
address endogeneity in section 5.6).   
 
5.3 Distance effects 
Because of the importance of distance in determining practice choice we investigate the robustness 
of baseline model to alternative specifications of distance. Table 5 reports estimates from model 
with different assumptions about the way in which distance affects the utility derived from practice 
choice.  The statistically significant negative effects of distance are similar in all the specifications, 
except for log distance model which has worse goodness of fit. Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of 
distance on the probability of choice of practice and shows that the negative marginal effects of 
distance decrease with distance with distance in all the polynomial specifications.  The effect of 
quality is positive and significant in all specifications. Adding squared and cubed distance to the 
linear model reduces the average marginal effect of quality but adding further fourth and fifth 
powers of distance makes no difference to the effect of quality and has miniscule implications for 
goodness of fit.  We therefore prefer the simpler cubic specification as our baseline model. 
 
5.4 Patient preference heterogeneity 
Using the baseline specification, we begin by allowing the parameters to differ by age and gender. 
Previous literature has suggested that preferences for medical practitioners differ across men and 
women and individuals of different ages. We estimate separate models for 12 age and gender group 
and report the results in Table 6.  We present only the parameters on quality and distance, but the 
other practice characteristics have very similar patterns of marginal effects across age and gender 
groups.  The table shows the impact of quality and distance on choice are very similar for men and 
women.  Broadly, the effect of both quality and distance on choice appear to be non-linear in age, 
being most important to men and women in the middle of the age distribution.  Individuals in the 
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Table 6.  Age and gender specific models of practice choice 
(a)  Female patients 
 
Female patients Female 25-34 Female 35-44 Female 45-64 Female 65-74 Female 75+ 
 
AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z 
QOF 2006/7 Total 
points 
0.00014 6.90 0.00012 6.30 0.00017 7.17 0.00016 6.80 0.00012 5.46 0.00010 4.88 
Distance (cubic) -0.06828 -14.12 -0.07407 -12.96 -0.07696 -15.69 -0.06912 -14.20 -0.05783 -10.68 -0.05428 -9.36 
BIC 5821715 
 
1065304 
 
1190200 
 
2131564 
 
724667 
 
705954 
 
McFadden R2 0.4027 
 
0.3969 
 
0.4006 
 
0.3960 
 
0.4080 
 
0.4315 
 
N LSOA 2870 
 
2870 
 
2870 
 
2870 
 
2870 
 
2870 
 
N GP practices 987 
 
987 
 
987 
 
987 
 
987 
 
987 
 
N patients 1695176 
 
296655 
 
342635 
 
619342 
 
217724 
 
218734 
 
 
(b) Male patients 
 
Male patients Male 25-34 Male 35-44 Male 45-64 Male 65-74 Male 75+ 
 
AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z 
QOF 2006/7 Total 
points 
0.00012 6.75 0.00006 4.33 0.00014 6.99 0.00015 6.94 0.00011 5.26 0.00012 5.47 
Distance (cubic) -0.06727 -14.09 -0.06176 -9.82 -0.07498 -15.14 -0.07039 -14.93 -0.05593 -10.44 -0.06042 -10.73 
BIC 5892072 
 
1159008 
 
1284654 
 
2241766 
 
702826 
 
499963 
 
McFadden R2 0.3884 
 
0.3779 
 
0.3893 
 
0.3865 
 
0.3966 
 
0.4109 
 
N LSOA 2870 
 
2870 
 
2870 
 
2870 
 
2870 
 
2870 
 
N GP practices 987 
 
987 
 
987 
 
987 
 
987 
 
987 
 
N patients 1668912 
 
311551 
 
359641 
 
638990 
 
207999 
 
150643 
 
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects. Models contain same practice covariates as model of Table 2.   
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Table 7.   Models stratified by socioeconomic characteristics of small areas (LSOAs) 
(a) Rurality, income deprivation, education. 
 Rurality Income deprivation Proportion adults with no formal 
education 
 Urban Rural Lowest 4 quintiles Top quintile Lowest 4 quintiles Top quintile 
 AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z 
QOF 2006/7 Total points 0.00017 7.98 0.00003 1.80 0.00014 6.10 0.00010 3.40 0.00013 5.81 0.00014 4.10 
Distance (cubic) -0.08518 -16.35 -0.01548 -3.47 -0.06056 -12.19 -0.09852 -8.22 -0.06336 -11.64 -0.09623 -10.48 
BIC 9447553  2247370  9039531  2648384  9386616  2316353  
McFadden R2 0.365  0.501  0.410  0.346  0.396  0.397  
N LSOA 2100  770  2295  575  2295  575  
N GP practices 811  867  984  676  982  744  
N patients 2417776  946487  2720471  643792  2712696  651567  
 
(b) Self assessed health, Asian ethnicity 
 Proportion with poor self-assessed health Proportion of Asian ethnicity 
 Lowest 4 quintiles Top quintile Lowest 4 quintiles Top quintile 
 AME z AME z AME z AME z 
QOF 2006/7 Total points 0.00016 6.51 0.00007 2.77 0.00011 5.18 0.00021 5.93 
Distance (cubic) -0.07075 -13.60 -0.06246 -6.06 -0.05234 -10.40 -0.12061 -13.22 
BIC 9322153  2383773  8469297  3221563  
McFadden R2 0.393  0.408  0.430  0.287  
N LSOA 2296  574  2294  576  
N GP practices 977  772  980  601  
N patients 2707346  656917  2687812  676451  
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects. Models also contained a dummy for missing PMS status. Models contain same practice covariates as model in Table 2. 
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middle age group are most likely to be time constrained (they will be more likely to have both 
working household members and children) so the larger effect of distance for this group is 
understandable. Choices by the youngest group of men (those aged 25-34) are least affected by 
quality and distance has the smallest negative effect for older women.  This lower effect of quality in 
young men may reflect either a general lack of awareness of health issues and/or a lack of need for 
health care in this age group. 
 
Table 7 allows for heterogeneity of preferences across patients living in small areas with different 
levels of rurality, income deprivation, educational qualifications, self assessed health, and ethnicity.  
In all cases patients are more likely to choose practices which have higher clinical quality and are 
closer, but there are some interesting differences by small area characteristics of the patients.
18
 The 
marginal effects of practice characteristics on the probability of choice of practice are smaller for 
rural LSOAs than urban LSOAs, but the magnitudes of the marginal effects of characteristics relative 
to distance are not greatly different. For example, a 1 point increase in QOF points would have the 
same effect on choice probability as a reduction in distance of 1.9 metres for rural patients and 1.8 
metres for urban patients.  However, there is a difference across patients by patient deprivation.   
The choices of patients in LSOAs which are in the top quintile of income deprivation, or the top 
quintile for no educational qualifications, or for poor self- assessed health are more affected by 
distance and less by quality. For patients from LSOAs in these top quintiles, a 1 point increase in total 
QOF points has the same effect on choice probabilities as a 1 metre decrease in distance, whereas 
for small areas in the other quintiles, the effect of a 1 QOF point increase has the same effect as a 2 
metre decrease in distance. 
 
The analyses in Table 7 allow for observed heterogeneity. Table 8 compares the results from a mixed 
logit model, which allows for unobserved heterogeneity, and our baseline conditional logit 
specification. To facilitate comparison, the table reports coefficient estimates rather than AMEs and 
we present estimates for all the variables in the model.  The upper part of the table shows that the 
mean values of the mixed logit coefficients are very similar to those from the baseline conditional 
logit model of Table 2. The lower part of the table shows that standard deviations of the mixed logit 
coefficients, except for the distance and quality variables, are not significantly different from zero.  
As the mean estimates are similar across the two models and the mixed logit model cannot easily be 
used to estimate average marginal effects, we prefer to report results from the more restrictive 
conditional logit models. 
 
5.5 Catchment areas and closed lists: specification of the choice set 
In interpreting the results we assume that practice lists are determined by patient decisions, rather 
than practice decisions.  But because practices have a legal obligation to make home visits if these 
are medically necessary, they will be reluctant to accept patients who live a considerable distance 
from the practice.  Practices are allowed to agree catchment areas with their PCTs and are not 
obliged to accept patients who live outside this catchment area. Thus an observed negative effect of 
distance on the probability of patients in an LSOA being on the list of a practice may be due to 
decisions by practices as well as by patients.  
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 The qualitative patterns of the other covariates are mostly very similar to those in the non-stratified model.  Patients 
from all types of small area are more likely to choose practices with a higher proportion of female GPs, a smaller 
proportion of non-European qualified GP and have younger GPs. 
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Table 8.   Comparison of mixed and conditional logit models 
 Mixed logit Conditional logit 
 Mean of coefficients z Coefficient t 
QOF 200607 Total points 0.0029 11.548 0.00224 14.584 
Practice in different PCT -0.891 -10.551 -0.826 -19.004 
Distance  -1.556 -38.506 -1.563 -40.057 
Distance squared 0.109 9.058 0.121 10.545 
Distance cubed -0.00417 -4.575 -0.00432 -4.881 
GP age -0.0254 -15.52 -0.025 -15.681 
Proportion female GPs 0.262 7.771 0.262 7.85 
Proportion GPs non Europe trained -0.522 -18.954 -0.527 -19.333 
Opted out 0.0998 2.732 0.0943 2.613 
PMS 0.104 3.281 0.098 3.133 
Standard deviation of coefficients     
QOF 200607 Total points 0.00317 7.019   
LSOAs from different PCTs -0.478 -1.762   
Distance km 0.214 8.283   
Distance squared km -0.00439 -1.563   
Distance cubed km 0.000341 1.979   
GP age 0.00633 1.226   
Female GPs 0.0071 0.2   
GPs trained outside Europe -0.048 -0.847   
Opted out 0.308 2.088   
PMS 0.0759 0.344   
BIC 11704471  11714907  
McFadden R2 .  0.3955  
N LSOA 2870  2870  
N GP practices 987  987  
N patients 3364263  3364263  
Notes: Table reports coefficients.  Models also contain a dummy for missing PMS status.  
 
In Appendix C we sketch a model of practice choice of catchment area and discuss the implications 
for interpretation of our estimates.  We show that if practices preferentially accept patients who live 
closer to the practice this will not produce an association between the proportion of a particular 
>^K ?ƐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐĐŚŽŽƐŝŶŐĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? The argument is as follows.  It is 
possible that a practice whose patients are closer to the practice will have higher quality, either 
because it is harder to achieve higher quality if there is less contact between patients and GPs or 
because practices with higher quality have higher demand from patients and set smaller catchment 
areas for any given list size. Either of these mechanisms would lead to a negative association 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵ
all LSOAs in its catchment area.
19
   But it would not imply any relationship between the proportion of 
any particular LSOA choosing the practice and practice quality since the latter depends on the 
average distance of all practice patients.  
 
Practices can close their lists to patients even if they live in the practice catchment area. Practices 
might wish to exclude patients who are more difficult to treat and who would therefore lower 
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 Jenkins and Campbell (1996) found that higher quality practices in London had smaller catchment areas. 
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average quality. But a practice can refuse an application to join its list from a patient in their 
catchment area only if it has formally notified their local PCT that its list is closed. If the practice list 
is open it cannot refuse patients in its catchment area.  For practices intending to stay in business, 
list closures must be temporary since each year around 8% of patients will leave a practice list 
(primarily due to residential moves) (Hippisley-Cox et al, 2005). Our practice list data are a snapshot 
of the distribution of patients across practices at a given date and reflects patient choices over a 
number of years, so we think that list closure is unlikely to have major implications for our results. 
 
Nevertheless, although we do not think that ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐĞƚcatchment areas or to close their 
list to new patients can account for a positive association between ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĂŶ >^K ?Ɛ
patients on a practice list and the quality of the practice, we undertake two further robustness tests. 
If catchment areas are a binding constraint on patients, then models estimated with large radii or 
without restrictions on the number of patients from the LSOA registered at the practice, should yield 
different results from those estimated with tighter constraints.  First, we estimate models in which 
the radius of the choice set for LSOAs is restricted progressively from 10km down to 8km, 6km, 4km 
and 2km.  Second, we restrict the choice set for LSOAs to practices which have at least 1, 5, 10, or 50 
of their patients drawn from the LSOA.  By restricting the choice sets for LSOAs we make it less likely 
that the observed distribution of LSOA patients across practices in the choice sets is due to decisions 
by GPs about catchment areas. 
 
Tables 9 and 10 report these investigations. Table 9 presents the average marginal effects from 
models in which we attempt to capture catchment area effects by restricting LSOA choice sets by 
distance.  Table 9 shows that the average marginal effect of distance becomes larger (absolutely) as 
the choice set becomes smaller. This is to be expected: as Figure 3 shows the effect of distance 
declines with distance to the practice and restricting the choice set reduces the average distance to 
practices.  
 
 
Notes: Plot of the average marginal effects of distance for linear (km), quadratic (km2), cubic (km3), quartic (km4), and 
quintic (km5) specifications for models in Table 5.  
Figure 3.  Estimates of the average marginal effects of distance 
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Table 9.  Choice sets: different radii 
Choice set radius 10km 8km 6km 4km 2km 
  AME z AME z AME z AME z AME z 
QOF 2006/7 total points 0.00013 6.87 0.00014 6.94 0.00019 7.07 0.00029 7.76 0.00044 7.98 
Distance (cubic) -0.06778 -14.18 -0.07751 -14.2 -0.09964 -14.72 -0.15248 -16.76 -0.26363 -23.16 
BIC 11714907  11262610  10556052  9096439  5279364  
McFadden R2 0.3955  0.3621  0.3094  0.2267  0.1056  
N LSOA 2870  2806  2670  2428  1925  
N GP practices 987  931  855  729  605  
N patients 3296554  3195654  3008865  2665613  1844381  
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects from models in which the LSOA choice sets are restricted to practices within stated radii.  Models contain same practice covariates as model in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 10.  Choice sets: practices with minimum numbers of patients from LSOA 
Minimum patients from  
LSOA in practice 
0 patients 1 patient 5 patients 10 patients 20 patients 50 patients 
 
AME z AME  AME z AME z AME z AME z 
QOF 2006/7 total 
points 0.00013 6.87 0.00019 7.18 0.00026 7.47 0.00029 7.82 0.00032 7.99 0.00031 7.07 
Distance (cubic) -0.06778 -14.18 -0.09690 -15.60 -0.12680 -18.01 -0.14037 20.94 -0.14739 -24.43 -0.13713 -25.88 
BIC 11714907   11351519   10649668   10056703   9195685   7367098   
McFadden R2 0.3955   0.2983   0.2126   0.1711   0.1284   0.0717   
N LSOA 2870   2865   2842   2802   2765   2670   
N GP practices 987   889   814   774   751   719   
N patients 3364263   3353087   3298413   3220697   3118525   2850124   
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects from models in which LSOA choice sets are restricted to practices chosen by minimum numbers (0 to 50) of patients from the LSOA.  Models 
contain same practice covariates as model in Table 2.  
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While the average marginal effects for both quality and distance change in Table 9 as we restrict the 
choice set, the ratio of the marginal effect of quality to distance is quite stable across the definition 
of the choice set.  The ratio of quality marginal effect to distance marginal effect is approximately 18 
percent higher for choice sets defined over 10km compared to over 2km.  Table 10 reports average 
marginal effects from models in which LSOA choice sets are restricted to practices which have a 
minimum number of patients from the LSOA on their list.  Again the trade-off between quality and 
distance is similar across the different definitions of choice sets.  The similarity of the estimates 
across the restricted choice sets is thus in line with the choice process being the same across the sets 
and unaffected by GP behaviour in deciding catchment areas or temporarily closing lists.
20
 
 
5.6 Endogeneity and measurement error 
Although we have examined a number of different quality variables, it is possible that we measure 
quality with error.  It is also possible that practice quality is determined in part by the demographic, 
socio-economic and health characteristics of the patients on its list (see Appendix C).  If different 
patient types have different preferences over practice characteristics the quality measure may be 
correlated with unobserved demand factors. The endogeneity bias could go either way: practices 
which are better could attract more complex patients with whom it is more difficult to achieve QOF 
points, or better educated individuals who may be easier to treat may be more likely to choose 
better practices. To address this we have used a lagged measure of practice quality as our preferred 
measure, as this reduces bias arising from unobserved patient characteristics that affect both 
current quality and the patient preferences towards quality.   
 
To further allow for possible endogeneity and measurement error, we estimate a model in which we 
instrument practice quality by the average quality of neighbouring practices. The quality of 
neighbouring practices is a good predictor of practice quality because neighbouring practices will 
have similar types of patient who are exposed to similar environments, and will operate under 
similar cost conditions when producing quality.  The instrument will be uncorrelated with practice 
demand errors provided that there are no unobservable factors affecting demand which are 
correlated across neighbouring practices and which affect practice quality. 
 
We implement the instrumental variable using two stage residual inclusion (Terza et al, 2008).  We 
first estimate an OLS model of practice quality for all practices in the choice sets of LSOAs in the East 
Midlands. In addition to the instrument (average quality of neighbouring practices), the first stage 
quality model contains the variables in the choice model, averaged over the LSOAs whose choice 
sets contain the practice. The practice observations are weighted by the number of LSOA choice sets 
in which a practice appears.  The residuals from the first stage model are included in the second 
stage conditional logit model as an additional explanatory variable.  The estimated coefficient on the 
quality measure in the choice model is an unbiased estimate of the effect of quality if the instrument 
is valid.  We bootstrap the standard errors on the coefficients in the second stage choice model. 
21
                                                 
20
 This may be because few patients would wish to be further away from their practice than the maximum distance GPs are 
willing to travel to patients. 
21
 We draw 100 random bootstrap samples of 987 LSOAs with replacement from the set of 987 practices chosen by 
patients in the East Midlands.  We estimate the first stage quality model for the practices in the choice sets of LSOAs in 
each bootstrap sample, weighting the observations by the number of times the practice appears in the choice sets 
(including multiple draws of the same LSOA as separate observations).  We estimate the second stage choice model for 
each bootstrap sample of LSOAs, adding the residuals from the first stage quality regression, and weighting LSOAs by 
number of times they appear in the bootstrap sample.  We then compute the standard deviation of the 100 estimates of 
the second stage coefficients. 
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Table 11 presents the results of instrumenting our preferred measure of practice quality (total 
2006/7 QOF points) with the average total 2006/7 QOF ƉŽŝŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƐŶĞĂƌĞƐƚŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŝŶŐ
practices and including the residuals from the first stage quality model in the second stage. The full 
first stage results are in Table B2. The nearest neighbour instruments have F statistics of 18.54 for 
quality, which is comfortably greater than the conventional critical value of 10 (Stock et al, 2002).  
The residuals are significant in the 2SRI second stage models, suggesting that the quality measure is 
endogenous. 
 
Table 11 reports the quality and distance estimates from the 2SRI choice model estimated on the full 
sample of LSOAs in column (1), the average results from 100 bootstrap replications of the choice 
model in column (2) and the ratio of the full sample 2SRI average marginal effect estimates to the 
standard deviation of the bootstrap estimates in column (3). Comparison of columns (1) and (2) 
show the results are not sensitive to which sample is used and column (3) shows the marginal effects 
are statistically significant.  Instrumenting increases the estimated average marginal effect of quality 
from the baseline estimate of 0.00013 (Table 2) to 0.00074 for 2006/7 QOF points. This suggests that 
practices which provide good quality also attract more complex patients, lowering measured 
performance.  
 
Table 11.  Instrumented quality    
 
Full sample AME 
 
(1) 
Av AME  
bootstrap models 
(2) 
z 
 
(3) 
QOF 2006/7 Total points 0.00074 0.00073 4.35 
QOF 2006/7 residuals -0.00044 -0.00044 -3.02 
Different PCT -0.10942 -0.10701 -9.85 
Distance (cubic) -0.11108 -0.10686 -18.82 
GP age -0.00281 -0.00266 -11.50 
Female GPs 0.03084 0.02916 6.52 
GPs non Europe trained  -0.06328 -0.06204 -10.26 
Opted out 0.00803 0.00815 1.78 
PMS 0.01021 0.00991 2.36 
BIC 11713232 11720971 
 
McFadden R2 0.3956 0.3955 
 
N LSOA 2870 1816 
 
N GP practices 987 965 
 
N patients 3364263 2128248 
 
F statistic on first stage IV 18.53 
  
Notes: Results from two stage residual inclusion (2SRI) conditional logit models.  For each model we report the results from 
the 2SRI model estimated with the full sample of LSOAs, the average of the bootstrap results from 100 replications, and 
ratio of the observed average marginal effect to the standard deviation of the bootstrap average marginal effects.  All 
models also included a dummy for imputed PMS status. 
 
We also use the average quality of neighbouring practices to instrument quality as measured by 
average QOF points 2006/7-2009/10 and total QOF points 2009/10. The F statistics for the 
instruments are 19.17 and 29.62 respectively and the residuals are significant in the second stage 
estimates. The instrumented estimates of the average marginal effects of the quality measures are 
again larger than the unistrumented estimates (compare Table 4), particularly so for 2009/10 QOF 
points.  After instrumenting the average marginal effects are very similar across the three measures 
of quality (0.00074 for 2006/7 QOF points, 0.00087 for averaged 2006/7-2009/10 QOF points, and 
0.00064 for 2009/10 QOF points), again suggesting endogeneity in the raw quality measures. 
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5.7 Summarising the effects of quality on patient demand 
In Table 12 we summarise the estimated effects of quality on practice choice and compare these 
with the effects of the average age of the practice GPs, the proportion of female GPs, and the 
proportion who qualified outside Europe.  We compare the effects of 1/10
th
 standard deviation 
increases in each of the variables.  In addition to the average marginal effects (the change in 
probability that a patient will choose the practice in response to the change in the practice 
characteristic or quality), we report the extra distance in metres patients would be willing to travel 
to be in a practice whose characteristic or quality had increased,
22
 the number of additional patients 
a practice would gain, and the elasticity of practice numbers with respect to the characteristic or 
quality.  We report the calculations for our baseline model using un-instrumented quality and for the 
2SRI model of Table 11. 
 
Table 12.  Estimated effect sizes for quality and other practice characteristics 
 
Estimates from un-instrumented models Estimates from instrumented models 
 
AME 
 
(1) 
Extra 
metres 
(2) 
Patients 
gained 
(3) 
Elasticity 
 
(4) 
AME 
 
(5) 
Extra 
metres 
(6) 
Patients 
gained 
(7) 
Elasticity 
 
(8) 
2006/7 QOF points  
(1/10
th
 SD increase) 
0.00082 12.4 103.6 1.44 0.00472 31.0 255.9 3.59 
Standard error 0.00012 0.9 9.4 0.06 0.00108 5.3 30.1 0.59 
Av age GPs  
(1/10
th
 SD increase) 
-
0.00096 
-14.6 -120.6 0.003 -0.00188 -12.4 -102.1 0.00 
Standard error 0.00007 0.9 5.3 0.00 0.00016 1.2 6.2 0.00 
Prop female GPs  
(1/10
th
 SD increase) 
0.00374 56.7 468.1 0.07 0.03824 50.2 414.8 0.06 
Standard error 0.00061 7.2 47.3 0.01 0.00586 7.3 45.3 0.01 
Prop non-European 
trained GPs  
(1/10
th
 SD increase) 
-
0.01072 
-162.7 -1342.4 -0.08 -0.11200 -147.2 -1215.1 -0.07 
Standard error 0.00103 -8.7 93.6 0.00 0.01091 -9.6 90.6 0.00 
Notes: 1/10
th
 SD 2006/7 points 6.36; 1/10
th
 SD average GP age: 0.67 years; 1/10
th
 SD proportion female GPs: 0.025. 1/10
th
 
SD proportion non-European trained GPs: 0.035. AME: average marginal effect.  Metres: number of metres patients would 
be willing to travel to practice with one unit higher value of characteristic.   Patients gained: number of additional patients 
aged 25 and over choosing a practice if characteristic increased by one standard deviation. Elasticity: percentage increase 
in number of patients aged 25 and over choosing a practice from a one percent increase in the characteristic. 
 
Using first the estimates from our uninstrumented baseline model, column (1) shows that the 
absolute magnitudes of the average marginal effects of quality is small compared to other features 
of the GP practice. The increase in the probability of a practice being chosen by a patient if its QOF 
points increase by 1/10
th
 standard deviation is 0.00082, which is similar to the effect of a one 
standard deviation in average age of a GP but considerably smaller than the response to a one 
standard deviation change in the proportion female or trained outside the EU.  Column (2) shows 
patients are willing to travel 12.4 metres for a one standard deviation in QOF points, whereas they 
would be willing to travel between an extra 56.7 metres to a practice with a 1/10
th
  SD greater 
proportion of female GPs.     
 
However, what matters in terms of the incentives for practices to increase quality is the number of 
patients they will gain. This depends both on the effect of quality on the probability of a patient 
choosing the practice and the number of patients in whose choice set the practice lies.   An average 
                                                 
22
 This is equal to 1000 times marginal rate of substitution between quality or the practice characteristic and distance 
measured in kilometres, as defined in section 4.2 in (10). 
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practice has 74,529 potential patients aged 25 and over resident within 5 km and 25,070 within 2 
km. Column (3) shows that the estimated increase in practice patients from a 1/10
th
 SD increase in 
quality is 103.6.  Thus although the effect of a 1/10
th
 standard deviation increase in quality on the 
probability of an individual patient choosing the practice is small, the number of additional patients 
gained by the practice is not trivial, though smaller then the number of patients gained by 1/10 
standard deviation increases in the proportion of GPs that are female or trained inside the EU (486 
and 1342 respectively).  
 
Column (4) presents the elasticity of practice demand with respect to quality. This measure is scale 
invariant and so is not affected by differences in the variance of the quality measure and the practice 
covariates (which does affect the comparison of the estimates in columns (2) and (3)). This quality 
elasticity is large: a 1% increase in 2006/7 QOF points implies a 1.44% increase in practice list size.  
Thus quality appears to be important to patient choice. Results in the right hand panel (columns (5) 
to (7)) of the table use the less conservative instrumented measure. They reinforce the importance 
of quality, as the average marginal effect of quality estimate in column (5) is nearly 6 times as high as 
that in column (1). If this estimate is used, then the average patient would be willing to travel an 
extra 31 metres for a 1/10
th
 of a standard deviation increase in quality, which would result in a gain 
of an extra 260 patients for the practice.  These estimates suggest a very high quality elasticity of 
nearly 3.6. 
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6. Conclusion 
The issue of whether choice and competition will increase quality of health care services is both 
current and important. A pre-requisite for increased competition to increase quality is that 
demanders are responsive to quality.  We have tested whether they do in an important setting  W the 
choice by patients of their family physicians who, in the context we examine, determine access to all 
health care services at zero direct monetary cost for the patient. 
 
We examine the choices of 3.4 million patients from amongst nearly 1000 family doctor practices.  
We find quality is important: patients are more likely to choose practices with higher measured (and 
published) clinical quality.  Patients trade off quality against distance. The results are robust to 
alternative estimation methods, to the way in which distance was assumed to affect choice of 
practice, to possible restrictions on patient choice sets and across age, gender and socio-economic 
circumstances of patients.  While the effect of quality on the probability of an individual patient 
choosing a family practice is small, this does not translate into a small incentive for practices to 
increase quality in order to attract more patients.  What matters for practices is how many 
additional patients will be attracted by an increase in quality and this depends both on the small 
effect of quality on the probability of choice by an individual patient and on the large number of 
patients who could choose the practice.  Using the most conservative of our model specifications we 
estimate that a one standard deviation increase in measured clinical quality would attract 
approximately 15 percent more patients to a family practice.  Thus practices seeking to attract 
patients could do so by raising quality.  If the marginal revenue from additional patients sufficiently 
exceeds their marginal cost so as to cover the costs of higher quality then greater competition in this 
market could potentially improve quality for patients.  
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Appendix A  
Table A.1  Data sources 
Data set Variables Source 
Attribution 
Data Set  
Nos patients in each 
LSOA by age/gender on 
list of each practice 
NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care.  
Quality and 
Outcomes 
Framework 
QOF points total and by 
indicator; numbers for 
whom indicator 
achieved, exceptions. 
www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-data-collections/audits-and-
performance/the-quality-and-outcomes-framework. 
 
GP Patient 
Survey 
Patient satisfaction with 
practice 
www.gp-patient.co.uk/archive_weighted/practicereport 
Hospital 
Episode 
Statistics 
Emergency admissions 
for ambulatory care 
sensitive conditions 
www.hesonline.nhs.uk 
General 
Medical Service 
Statistics 
Age, gender, country of 
qualification of GPs, 
practice contract, out of 
hour status, dispensing 
status, location. 
NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care 
NHS Choices Location of branch 
practices 
www.nhs.uk/Pages/HomePage.aspx 
Neighbourhood 
Statistics 
Socio-economic and 
demographic measures 
at LSOA level 
www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination 
Index of 
Multiple 
Deprivation 
LSOA income 
deprivation;  
www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/indiciesdeprivation07 
 
Office of 
National 
Statistics 
LSOA rurality 
classification  
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/geography/products/area-
classifications/index.html 
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Table A2.  Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions: ICD10 Codes  
Asthma J45 J46 
Circulatory system  I110 I130 I132 I10 I119 I129 I139  
COPD   J20 J41 J42 J43 J44 J47 J40 
Stroke/LVD   I60 I61 I63 I64 I66 I672 I698 R470 
EPILEPSY   G40 G41 R56 G253 R568 
CHD/LVD   I20 I240 I248 I249 I25 R072 I21 I22 I110 I130 I132 I255 I50 J81 
Diabetes  E110 E111 E112 E113 E114 E115 E116 E117 E118 E119 E10  E120 E121 
E122 E128 E130 E131 E132 E133 E134 E135 E136 E137 E138 E140 
E141  E142 E143 E144 E145 E146 E147 E148 
DKD or Dementia  N03 F00 F01 F02 F03 
Alcohol-related disease F10 
Perforated appendix K350 K351 
Dehydration & gastroenteritis A020 A04 A059 A072 A080 A081 A083 A082 A084 A085 A09 E86 K520 
K521 K522 K528 K529  
Cellulitis I891 L010 L011 L020 L021 L022 L023 L024 L028 L029 L03 L04 L080 
L088 L089 L88 L980 
ENT H66 H67 J02 J03 J040 J06 J312 
Gangrene  R02 
Influenza and pneumonia  A481 A70 J10 J11 J120 J121 J122 J128 J129 J13 J14 J153 J154 J157 
J159  
 J160 J168 J18 J181 J189 J180 J188 
Iron-deficiency anaemia  D460 D461 D463 D464 D501 D508 D509 D510 D511 D512 D513 D518 
D520 D521 D528 D529 D531 D571 D580 D581 D590 D591 D592 D599 
D601 D608 D609 D610 D611 D640 D641 D642 D643 D644 D648 E40 
E41 E42 E43 E550 E643 
Other vaccine preventable diseases A35 A36 A37 A80 B05 B06 B161 B169 B180 B181 B26 G000 M014 
Pelvic inflammatory  N70 N73 N74 
Perforated/bleeding ulcer  K20 K210 K219 K221 K226  K250 K251 K252 K254 K255 K256 K260 
K261 K262 K264 K265 K266 K270 K271 K272 K274 K275 K276 K280 
K281 K282 K284 K285 K286 K920 K921 K922 
Atrial fibrillation and flutter  I498 R000 I471 I479 I499 R002 R008 I495 
Constipation  K590 
Urinary infection  N11 N136 N10 N151 N159 N12 N390 N300 N309 N308 
Fracture proximal femur  S722 S720 S721 
Peripheral vascular disease  I73 I738 I739 
Failure to thrive  R629 
Dyspepsia  K21 K30 
Hypokalemia  E876 
Low birth weight  P050 P052 P059 P072 P073 
Migraine  G43 G440 G441 G443 G444 G448 R51 
Tuberculosis  A15 A16 A17 A18 A19 
Dental conditions  A690 K098 K099 K02 K03 K04 K05 K06 K08 K12 K13 
38  CHE Research Paper 88  
  
Table A3. Correlations between quality measures 
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QOF 2006/7 organisational  0.531 1.000 
         
  
QOF 2006/7 patient 
experience 
0.354 0.443 1.000 
        
  
QOF 2006/7 additional 
services  
0.388 0.513 0.549 1.000 
       
  
QOF 2006/7 holistic  0.916 0.494 0.320 0.357 1.000 
      
  
QOF 2006/7 total points 0.897 0.791 0.638 0.589 0.831 1.000 
     
  
QOF 2009/10 total points 0.511 0.351 0.207 0.243 0.489 0.494 1.000 
    
  
Average QOF total points 
2006/7-2009/10 
0.812 0.656 0.467 0.478 0.766 0.856 0.805 1.000 
   
  
ACSCs 2006/7 -0.108 -0.049 -0.059 -0.096 -0.089 -0.101 -0.163 -0.147 1.000 
  
  
Proportion patients who 
would recommend practice 
2009 
0.199 0.182 0.204 0.175 0.225 0.244 0.380 0.377 -0.239 1.000 
 
  
Overall patient satisfaction 
2009 
0.152 0.151 0.172 0.143 0.181 0.194 0.363 0.332 -0.187 0.917 1.000   
Satisfaction with opening 
hours 2009 
0.039 0.071 0.041 0.035 0.045 0.060 0.307 0.199 0.019 0.551 0.651 1.000  
Population achievement 
2009/10 
0.467 0.232 0.114 0.168 0.441 0.401 0.752 0.611 -0.119 0.167 0.160 0.151 1.000 
Reported achievement 
2009/10 
0.431 0.222 0.108 0.166 0.405 0.373 0.833 0.627 -0.133 0.142 0.126 0.141 0.868 
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Appendix B. Additional results 
Table B1.  Models with alternative clinical quality measures  
 
Baseline model (Quality 
measure: total 2006/7 
QOF points) 
Quality measure: 
reported achievement 
2009/10 
Quality measure: 
population 
achievement 
2009/10 
Baseline plus ACSCs 
2006/7 
 
AME z AME z AME z AME z 
QOF 2006/7 total points 0.00013 6.87     0.00012 6.514 
Reported achievement 2009/10   -0.00221 -1.079     
Population achievement 2009/10     0.00029 0.1073   
ACSCs 2006/7       -0.000004 -0.58 
Distance (cubic) -0.06778 -14.18 -0.016 -6.869 -0.0182 -7.578 -0.06659 -13.122 
BIC 11714907  11808124  11808224  11674461  
McFadden R2 0.3955  0.3936  0.3936  0.3960  
N LSOA 2870  2870  2870  2869  
N GP practices 987  994  994  985  
N patients 3364263  3372124  3372124  3355743  
Notes.  Average marginal effects and z statistics reported.  All models also contain same covariates as Table 2. Reported achievement for practice j is     max max/ /jq jq q qq qN D S S¦ ¦  
where Njq is the number of patients for whom QOF clinical indicator q is achieved by practice j, Djq is the number of patients who are declared eligible for indicator q, 
max
qS is the maximum 
number of points achievable for indicator q.   Population achievement is      max max/ /jq jq jq q qq qN D E S S¦ ¦  where Ejq is the number of patients exception reported for indicator q 
by practice j.  ACSCs is the number of emergency admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions of practice patients per 10,000 patients registered with the practice.   
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Table B2.  First stage estimates of practice quality (total 2006/7 QOF points) 
 Coefficient 
(t stat) 
Different PCT 9.624 
 (1.739) 
Distance  -5.287 
 (-0.896) 
Distance squared -0.0685 
 (-0.053) 
Distance cubed 0.0647 
 (0.642) 
GP age -1.167 
 (-3.407) 
Female GPs 11.25 
 (1.355) 
GPs non Europe trained  -19.16 
 (-2.992) 
PMS 5.895 
 (0.962) 
PMS imputed -77.16 
 (-4.200) 
Opted Out 7.109 
 (1.130) 
2 NN QOF 2006/7 0.177 
 (4.306) 
Constant 846.3 
 (18.451) 
Observations 987 
BIC 10988 
F statistic 18.54 
Notes.  The model is for the first stage of the two stage residual inclusion patient choice model reported in Table 11.  The 
dependent variable is total 2006/7QOF points.  Different PCT, Distance, Distance squared, Distance cubed are the averages 
of these practice-LSOA variables over the LSOAs whose choice sets included the practice.   2 NN QOF 2006/7 is the average 
of QOF total pointƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƐƚǁŽŶĞĂƌĞƐƚŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌƐ ? The F statistic is for the instrument. 
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Appendix C.  Practice choice of catchment area and quality 
Suppose that practice j sets a catchment area defined by a radius kj from its surgery. It accepts all 
patients who wish to join the practice provide they live within the catchment area. The choice set for 
the LSOA is the set of practices within whose catchment areas the LSOA falls:  
 ^ `a aj jC j d k d         (C1) 
 
We do not observe kj. We estimate models of patient choice by specifying the LSOA a choice set to 
be all practices j within a radius k of the LSOA centroid ie we specify the choice set to be 
 
{ }ka ajC j d k d         (C2) 
 
If we estimate patient choice models where we only include observations of naj within a radius k 
from the LSOA centroid and k > kj for some j then the conditional logit model may not yield 
consistent estimates of patient preferences. If there are LSOAs and practices for which k > daj > kj we 
will not observe any patients from a choosing practice j but this is due to the choice of catchment 
area by practice j and does not reflect choices by patients. The estimated coefficients will depend on 
patient preferences and the factors affecting practice decisions on catchment areas.  
 
McFadden (1974) has shown that, when the observed choices maximise a linear utility function 
where the errors in the utility function follow the extreme value distribution, the estimated 
conditional logit model coefficients are consistent estimates of the marginal utility from choice 
characteristics.  A subsequent paper (McFadden, 1978) proves that this result also holds when the 
model is estimated on a data set in which the set of alternatives for each individual satisfies the 
same type of arbitrary restriction.  
 
Thus if we estimate models where we specify choice sets with   
 
 min { }j jk kd          (C3) 
 
so that none of the practice catchment area constraints bind, we will produce consistent estimates 
of patient preferences over characteristics of practices.   The smaller the k defining the choice sets 
for the estimated model, the more likely is it that the estimated coefficients are the consistent 
estimates of patient marginal utility.  But the smaller is k the fewer the number of observations 
satisfying the constraint and the less the precise the estimates.  
 
These conclusion hold even though the practice catchment area is chosen to maximise practice 
utility and even if the practice takes account of the possible effect of catchment area on its quality 
and hence on patient demand.  The set of LSOAs within the catchment area is  
 
 Sj = S(kj) = {a_daj d kj}.         (C4) 
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where daj is the distance from LSOA to practice j.  The expected list of practice j is  
 
 nj = 
j j
h h h h
j aj a ajh a S h a S hn n n P   ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦  
           ( , ; , , )
j
h h a
a j aj j j ja S h n P q d    ¦ ¦ q d k          
       = ( , ; , , , , )j j j j j jn q k    d q d k           (C5) 
 
where hjn  is the number of patients of type h who chose the practice,  
h
ajn  is the number of patients 
of type h from LSOA a who choose practice j, 
h
an  is number of patients of type h in LSOA a. q-j, is the 
vector of the qualities of all other practices, a jd  is the vector of distances to all other practices from 
LSOA a, and k-j is the vector of the catchment area radii of all other practices. 
h
ajP  = P
h
(qj,daj,) is 
probability that a patient of type h in LSOA a chooses practice j.  
 
The list of practice j is increasing in the size of its catchment area and its quality, and decreasing in 
ƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ĐĂƚĐŚŵĞŶƚĂƌĞĂƐĂŶĚƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?
 
Practice quality qj is increasing in the effort by the practice and possibly decreasing in its catchment 
area if nearby patients are more likely to attend the practice to enable it to achieve its quality 
indicators.  Quality may also depend on the mix of patient types on the practice list 
 
 qj = q(ej, kj, 
h
jn ),   qej > 0, qkj d 0    (C6) 
 
where hjn  = (
1
,...,
H
j jn n ).   Substituting 
h h h
j aj ajan n P ¦ into (C6) and using the implicit function 
theorem,
23
 we can write the quality production function as  
 
 ( , ; , , , , )oj j j j j j jq q e k    d q d k       (C7) 
 
where we allow for the indirect effects of ej and kj on quality via their effect on the mix of patients.  
Note that, although the practice can set a catchment area, it is not permitted to directly select by 
type amongst patients in the catchment area. It will however take account of the effect of its choice 
of catchment area on the mix of patients.  
 
Practice revenue depends on quality (via the QOF) and on the number of patients and costs are 
increasing in the number of patients, effort and the distance to patients: 
 
 Rj = R(nj,qj, ),    Rn > 0, Rq  > 0     (C8) 
 cj = c(nj,ej,kj,),   cn  > 0, ce  > 0, ck   > 0   (C9) 
 
Practice j is altruistic and cares about practice income and quality 
 
 uj = u(yj, qj) = u(Rj  cj, qj),  uy > 0, uq > 0      (C10) 
 
and chooses effort and catchment area to satisfy 
   0o o oy q n q e n q e e q eu R R n q c n q c u qª º     ¬ ¼      (C11) 
                                                 
23
 We assume that    11 / /h hj j jh q n n q  w w w w¦  so that 0, 0o oe kq q! d . 
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 0o oy n k q k n k q k ku R n n q c n n q cª º     ¬ ¼      (C12) 
 
In the Nash equilibrium where all practices choose their optimal ej and kj taking the decisions of 
other practices as given, the quality and catchment area of each practice will depend on parameters 
in the practice revenue, cost and utility functions and, via the demand function, on parameters in 
the patient utility function and on the parameters in the revenue, cost and utility functions of all 
other practices.   Individual patients will ignore the effect of their decisions on practice quality since 
even when quality depends on the patient mix a decision by a patient to join a practice will have a 
negligible effect on practice quality. 
